The U.S. Bombed a Dam in Syria That Was on a ‘No-Strike’ List

The U.S. Bombed a Dam in Syria That Was on a ‘No-Strike’ List


Near the peak of the battle in opposition to the Islamic State in Syria, a sudden riot of explosions rocked the nation’s largest dam, a towering, 18-story construction on the Euphrates River that held again a 25-mile-long reservoir above a valley the place tons of of hundreds of individuals lived.

The Tabqa Dam was a strategic linchpin and the Islamic State managed it. The explosions on March 26, 2017, knocked dam staff to the bottom and the whole lot went darkish. Witnesses say one bomb punched down 5 flooring. A hearth unfold, and essential gear failed. The mighty movement of the Euphrates River all of the sudden had no method by way of, the reservoir started to rise, and native authorities used loudspeakers to warn individuals downstream to flee.

The Islamic State, the Syrian authorities and Russia blamed the United States, however the dam was on the U.S. navy’s “no-strike list” of protected civilian websites and the commander of the U.S. offensive on the time, then-Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, stated allegations of U.S. involvement have been primarily based on “crazy reporting.”

“The Tabqa Dam is not a coalition target,” he declared emphatically two days after the blasts.

In reality, members of a prime secret U.S. Special Operations unit known as Task Force 9 had struck the dam utilizing among the largest typical bombs within the U.S. arsenal, together with at the very least one BLU-109 bunker-buster bomb designed to destroy thick concrete constructions, in line with two former senior officers. And they’d performed it regardless of a navy report warning to not bomb the dam, as a result of the injury may trigger a flood that may kill tens of hundreds of civilians.

Given the dam’s protected standing, the choice to strike it will usually have been made excessive up the chain of command. But the previous officers stated the duty power used a procedural shortcut reserved for emergencies, permitting it to launch the assault with out clearance.

Later, three staff who had rushed to the dam to stop a catastrophe have been killed in a special coalition airstrike, in line with dam staff.

The two former officers, who spoke on the situation that they not be named as a result of they weren’t approved to debate the strikes, stated some officers overseeing the air battle seen the duty power’s actions as reckless.

The revelation of Task Force 9’s function within the dam assault follows a sample described by The New York Times: The unit routinely circumvented the rigorous airstrike approval course of and hit Islamic State targets in Syria in a method that repeatedly put civilians in danger.

Even with cautious planning, hitting a dam with such giant bombs would seemingly have been seen by prime leaders as unacceptably harmful, stated Scott F. Murray, a retired Air Force colonel, who deliberate airstrikes throughout air campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo.

“Using a 2,000-pound bomb against a restricted target like a dam is extremely difficult and should have never been done on the fly,” he stated. “Worst case, those munitions could have absolutely caused the dam to fail.”

After the strikes, dam staff found an ominous piece of excellent fortune: Five flooring deep within the dam’s management tower, an American BLU-109 bunker-buster lay on its facet, scorched however intact — a dud. If it had exploded, specialists say, the entire dam might need failed.

In response to questions from The Times, U.S. Central Command, which oversaw the air battle in Syria, acknowledged dropping three 2,000-pound bombs, however denied concentrating on the dam or sidestepping procedures. A spokesman stated that the bombs hit solely the towers hooked up to the dam, not the dam itself, and whereas prime leaders had not been notified beforehand, restricted strikes on the towers had been preapproved by the command.

“Analysis had confirmed that strikes on the towers attached to the dam were not considered likely to cause structural damage to the Tabqa Dam itself,” Capt. Bill Urban, the chief spokesman for the command, stated within the assertion. Noting that the dam didn’t collapse, he added, “That analysis has proved accurate.”

“The mission, and the strikes that enabled it, helped return control of the intact Tabqa Dam to the people of Northeast Syria and prevented ISIS from weaponizing it,” Captain Urban stated. “Had they been allowed to do so, our assessments at the time predicted that they would have inflicted further suffering on the people of Syria.”

But the 2 former officers, who have been instantly concerned within the air battle on the time, and Syrian witnesses interviewed by The Times, stated the scenario was way more dire than the U.S. navy publicly claimed.

Critical gear lay in ruins and the dam stopped functioning completely. The reservoir shortly rose 50 ft and practically spilled over the dam, which engineers stated would have been catastrophic. The scenario grew so determined that authorities at dams upstream in Turkey minimize water movement into Syria to purchase time, and sworn enemies within the yearslong battle — the Islamic State, the Syrian authorities, Syrian Defense Forces and the United States — known as a uncommon emergency cease-fire so civilian engineers may race to avert a catastrophe.

Engineers who labored on the dam, who didn’t need to be recognized as a result of they feared reprisal, stated it was solely by way of fast work, a lot of it made at gunpoint as opposing forces regarded on, that the dam and the individuals dwelling downstream of it have been saved.

“The destruction would have been unimaginable,” a former director on the dam stated. “The number of casualties would have exceeded the number of Syrians who have died throughout the war.”

The United States went into the battle in opposition to the Islamic State in 2014 with concentrating on guidelines meant to guard civilians and spare crucial infrastructure. Striking a dam, or different key civilian websites on the coalition’s “no-strike list,” required elaborate vetting and the approval of senior leaders.

But the Islamic State sought to take advantage of these guidelines, utilizing civilian no-strike websites as weapons depots, command facilities and combating positions. That included the Tabqa Dam.

The job power’s answer to this drawback too typically was to put aside the principles meant to guard civilians, present and former navy personnel stated.

Soon, the duty power was justifying the overwhelming majority of its airstrikes utilizing emergency self-defense procedures meant to avoid wasting troops in life-threatening conditions, even when no troops have been in peril. That allowed it to shortly hit targets — together with no-strike websites — that will have in any other case been off limits.

Rushed strikes on websites like colleges, mosques and markets killed crowds of ladies and kids, in line with former service members, navy paperwork obtained by The Times and reporting at websites of coalition airstrikes in Syria.

Perhaps no single incident reveals the brazen use of self-defense guidelines and the doubtless devastating prices greater than the strike on the Tabqa Dam.

At the beginning of the battle, the United States noticed the dam as a key to victory. The Soviet-designed construction of earth and concrete stood 30 miles upstream from the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed capital, Raqqa, and whoever managed the dam successfully managed the town.

Rebel teams captured the dam in 2013, and the Islamic State took management throughout its violent enlargement in 2014. For the following a number of years, the militants stored a small garrison within the dam’s towers, the place the thick concrete partitions and sweeping view created a ready-made fortress.

But it additionally remained a significant piece of civilian infrastructure. Workers on the dam continued to supply electrical energy for a lot of the area and regulate water for huge stretches of irrigated farmland.

In March 2017, when the United States and a world coalition launched an offensive to take the area from the Islamic State, they knew they must seize the dam to stop the enemy from deliberately flooding allied forces downstream.

Task Force 9 was in command of the bottom offensive and had been devising methods to take the dam for months earlier than the strike, in line with one former official. The job power ordered a report from specialised engineers within the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Defense Resources and Infrastructure workplace to evaluate what dimension of bombs may safely be utilized in an assault.

The company quickly got here again with a transparent advice: Do not strike the dam.

In a presentation that ran about 4 pages, in line with the 2 former officers, the engineers stated small weapons like Hellfire missiles, which have 20-pound warheads, could possibly be used on the earthen sections of the dam, but it surely was unsafe to make use of any bombs or missiles, irrespective of the scale, on the concrete constructions that managed the movement of water.

The former officers stated the report warned {that a} strike may trigger a crucial malfunction and a devastating flood that might kill tens of hundreds of individuals. The findings echoed a United Nations report from January 2017, which said that if assaults on the dam brought about it to fail, communities for greater than 100 miles downstream can be flooded.

The navy report was accomplished a number of weeks earlier than the strike and despatched to the duty power, one former official stated. But within the closing week of March 2017, a group of job power operators on the bottom determined to strike the dam anyway, utilizing among the largest typical bombs obtainable.

It is unclear what spurred the duty power assault on March 26.

At the time, the U.S.-led coalition managed the north shore of the reservoir and the Islamic State managed the south. The two sides had been in a standoff for weeks.

Captain Urban stated that U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces tried to take management of the dam and got here underneath hearth from enemy fighters, taking “heavy casualties.” Then the coalition struck the dam.

Dam staff stated they noticed no heavy combating or casualties that day earlier than the bombs hit.

What is obvious is that Task Force 9 operators known as in a self-defense strike, which meant they didn’t have to hunt permission from the chain of command.

A navy report obtained by way of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit reveals the operators contacted a B-52 bomber circling excessive overhead and requested a direct airstrike on three targets. But the report makes no point out of enemy forces firing or heavy casualties. Instead, it says the operators requested the strikes for “terrain denial.”

The two former officers stated the terrain denial request instructed that allied forces weren’t in peril of being overrun by enemy fighters, and that the duty power’s aim was more likely to preemptively destroy combating positions within the towers.

Launching that sort of offensive strike underneath self-defense guidelines was a surprising departure from how the air battle was presupposed to work, the officers stated.

Just just a few weeks later, when the United States determined to disable a canal system close to Raqqa, the strikes needed to be accredited by a navy concentrating on board in what one former official known as “an exhaustively detailed” course of.

None of that occurred with the dam, he stated.

A senior Defense Department official disputed that the duty power overstepped its authority by placing with out informing prime leaders. The official stated the strikes have been carried out “within approved guidance” set by the commander of the marketing campaign in opposition to the Islamic State, General Townsend. Because of that, the official stated, there was “no requirement that the commander be informed beforehand.”

First, the B-52 dropped bombs set to blow up within the air above the targets to keep away from damaging the constructions, the senior navy official stated. But when these did not dislodge the enemy fighters, the duty power known as for the bomber to drop three 2,000-pound bombs, together with at the very least one bunker-buster, this time set to blow up after they hit the concrete.

The job power additionally hit the towers with heavy artillery.

Days later, Islamic State fighters fled, sabotaging the dam’s already inoperable generators as they retreated, in line with engineers.

Satellite imagery from after the assault reveals gaping holes within the roofs of each towers, a crater within the concrete of the dam subsequent to the head-gates, and a hearth in one of many energy station buildings. Less apparent, however extra critical, was the injury inside.

Two staff have been on the dam that day. One of them, {an electrical} engineer, recalled Islamic State fighters positioned within the northern tower as normal that day, however no combating underway after they went into the dam to work on the cooling system.

Hours later, a shuddering sequence of booms knocked them to the ground. The room stuffed with smoke. The engineer discovered his method out into the daylight by way of a usually locked door that had been blown open.

He froze when he noticed the broad wings of an American B-52 in opposition to the clear blue sky.

Fearing that he can be mistaken for an enemy fighter, the engineer ducked again into the smoldering tower. The strikes had punched a jagged skylight by way of a number of tales. He regarded up and noticed hearth coming from the primary management room, which had been hit by the airstrike.

The dominoes of a possible catastrophe have been now in movement. Damage to the management room brought about water pumps to grab. Flooding then short-circuited electrical gear. With no energy to run essential equipment, water couldn’t cross by way of the dam, the reservoir crept larger. There was a crane that might increase the emergency floodgate, but it surely, too, had been broken by combating.

But the engineer knew if they might discover a strategy to get the crane working, they could be capable of open the floodgates.

He hid inside till he noticed the B-52 fly away after which discovered a motorbike. Though he had by no means pushed one earlier than, he sped as quick as he may to the home the place the dam supervisor lived, and defined what had occurred.

Engineers in Islamic State territory known as their former colleagues within the Syrian authorities, who then contacted allies within the Russian navy for assist.

A number of hours after the strike, a particular desk cellphone reserved for directed communications between the United States and Russia began ringing in a busy operations heart in Qatar. When a coalition officer picked up, a Russian officer on the opposite finish warned U.S. airstrikes had brought about critical injury to the dam and there was no time to waste, in line with a coalition official.

Less than 24 hours after the strikes, American-backed forces, Russian and Syrian officers and the Islamic State coordinated a pause in hostilities. A group of 16 staff — some from the Islamic State, some from the Syrian authorities, some from American allies — drove to the positioning, in line with the engineer, who was with the group.

They labored furiously because the water rose. The mistrust and rigidity have been so thick that at factors fighters shot into the air. They succeeded in repairing the crane, which finally allowed the floodgates to open, saving the dam.

The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces dismissed stories of great injury as propaganda. A spokeswoman stated the coalition had struck the dam with solely “light weapons, so as not to cause damage.”

A short while later, General Townsend denied the dam was a goal and stated, “When strikes occur on military targets, at or near the dam, we use noncratering munitions to avoid unnecessary damage to the facility.”

But within the days after the strike, officers working for the coalition air battle noticed Islamic State pictures of the unexploded bunker buster and tried to determine what had actually occurred, one official stated. Every U.S. airstrike is meant to be instantly reported to the operations heart, however Task Force 9 had not reported the dam strikes. That made them arduous to hint, stated one former official who looked for the data. He stated a group was solely capable of piece collectively what the duty power had performed by reviewing logs from the B-52.

At the air operations heart, senior officers have been shocked to learn the way the highest secret operators had bypassed safeguards and used heavy weapons, in line with one of many former officers, who reviewed the operation.

No disciplinary motion was taken in opposition to the duty power, the officers stated. The secret unit continued to strike targets utilizing the identical varieties of self-defense justifications it had used on the dam.

While the dam was nonetheless being repaired, the duty power despatched a drone over the neighborhood subsequent to the dam. As the drone circled, three of the civilian staff who had rushed to avoid wasting the dam completed their work and piled right into a small van and headed again towards their properties.

More than a mile away from the dam, the van was hit by a coalition airstrike, in line with staff. A mechanical engineer, a technician and a Syrian Red Crescent employee have been killed. The deaths have been reported extensively in Syrian media sources on-line, however as a result of the stories received the situation of the assault mistaken, the U.S. navy looked for strikes close to the dam and decided the allegation was “noncredible.” The civilian deaths have by no means been formally acknowledged.

The United States continued to strike targets and its allies quickly took management of the area.

John Ismay contributed reporting.


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