Examining the Evolution of Tunnel Warfare Tactics for Israel and Hamas

Examining the Evolution of Tunnel Warfare Tactics for Israel and Hamas

Six weeks after ‍the ground‌ invasion of the Gaza Strip started, Israeli forces and Hamas may have changed how⁣ they fight, using a weeklong​ truce​ to reassess⁤ performance and adapt their approach to battlefield conditions and the enemy’s actions.

A notable prediction by all experts that we appear to have got wrong – or has not come about yet – was the expected underground carnage. There has not (yet) been much fighting in ⁢the tunnels, ​and we have to wonder ⁢whether the foes will want to go into them at all.

A notable prediction by⁣ all ​experts that​ we appear to ‌have⁣ got wrong – or has not ⁤come about yet – ‌was the expected underground ⁤carnage. There has not (yet) been much fighting in the⁣ tunnels, and we have to wonder whether the foes will want to ‍go into them at all.

Wary ⁤of the length, ⁣spread and sophistication of ​Hamas’s tunnels, ‍the Israeli army was treading carefully. Urban areas were⁢ bombed heavily from the air ⁢from the start​ of the war on October 7, stopping only ⁢when Israeli ground forces were about to ​go in.

Before ⁤the truce at the end of⁣ November, Israel managed to encircle Gaza City. Many‌ Palestinians escaped to the south, heeding Israeli evacuation orders or ⁣simply fleeing for‌ their lives.

After the ​perimeter of Gaza City was⁢ taken, Israeli ⁣sources leaked that‌ some field commanders felt the price in⁢ soldiers ⁤and equipment ⁤was lower⁢ than expected with 104 combat casualties so far. But the high command opted for a cautious approach, staying out of the densest, built-up areas: parts of the old centre and Jabalia ​refugee camp.

Seemingly satisfied with what it did in Gaza City, the ⁣Israeli command decided ‌to repeat the strategy in⁢ the south, where it has now almost fully encircled Khan Younis.

Post from www.aljazeera.com

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